Abstract-The literature discussing pulse-shape discrimination (PSD) in organic scintillators dates back several decades. However, little has been written about PSD techniques that are optimized for neutron spectrum unfolding. Variation in n-γ misclassification rates and in γ /n ratio of incident fields can distort the neutron pulse-height response of scintillators and these distortions can in turn cause large errors in unfolded spectra. New applications in arms-control verification call for detection of lower-energy neutrons, for which PSD is particularly problematic. In this article, we propose techniques for removing distortions on pulse-height response that result from the merging of PSD distributions in the low-pulse-height region. These techniques take advantage of the repeatable shapes of PSD distributions that are governed by the counting statistics of scintillation-photon populations. We validate the proposed techniques using accelerator-based time-of-flight measurements and then demonstrate them by unfolding the Watt spectrum from measurement with a 252 Cf neutron source.
N
EUTRON spectroscopy may prove useful in the verification of future arms-control treaties [1] - [5] , and organic scintillators offer this possibility through spectrum unfolding of measured pulse-height spectra (PHS) [6] - [8] . However, the arms-control applications envisioned for neutron spectroscopy are more demanding than those to which spectrum unfolding has traditionally been applied. Since much of the energy spectrum of fission neutrons extends below one MeV, lower detection thresholds would be extremely helpful for characterizing special nuclear materials [3] . Additionally, some applications would require spectroscopy of higher resolution than previously attained through spectrum unfolding [1] , [5] . These considerations have set us to the task of improving the spectroscopic capabilities of our organic scintillators.
One of the main overlooked barriers to stable unfolding of fission-energy neutrons is the challenge of n-γ discrimination. With organic scintillators, this is met with pulse-shape discrimination (PSD). For neutron energies in the range of several MeV, PSD can be used to distinguish particle species with misclassification rates -defined as the fraction of detected γ -rays and neutrons (respectively) that are misclassified by PSD -on the order of 1/10 3 [3] . But at lower energies, misclassification rates rise and can alter the shape of pulse-height data used for spectroscopy. Due to the ill-posed nature of the unfolding problem, these changes can result in large error components in unfolded solutions [6] , especially if higher-resolution spectroscopy is sought. Additionally, arms-control applications would face large γ /n ratios, often on the order of 10s to 100s [1] . Even if γ -ray misclassification rates are low and held constant, the fraction of γ -rays that leak through are a significant problem for spectrum unfolding if not accounted for.
The demands placed on PSD for spectrum unfolding are somewhat different from those in other applications. Many neutron-counting applications require extremely highefficiency n-γ discrimination on a pulse-by-pulse basis, but this is not necessary for neutron spectroscopy. In order to construct PHS for spectroscopy we ask the more aggregate question: how many neutron-attributable scintillation pulses are detected in a series of pulse-height bins? For stable spectrum unfolding, we need the energy-dependent sensitivity of each pulse-height group (i.e. the response matrix) to neutrons to remain stable. We also need variation in γ /n ratio of measured fields to have a minimal impact on the shapes of neutron-attributed PHS. By shifting focus from the individual pulse to the aggregate pulse-height bin, we can use repeatable shapes of PSD distributions to make more stable estimates of the pulse-height-group count values. 1 We begin by outlining the arms-control applications we envision for spectrum unfolding with organic scintillators and how stabilization of PSD performance is crucial for these applications. Next, we use accelerator-based time-offlight (ToF) measurements, performed at University of Notre Dame, to characterize variations of PSD performance and track how they distort the shape of pulse-height response. In laboratory settings, ToF amounts to an alternative means of n-γ discrimination, independent of PSD and can therefore be used to evaluate PSD performance. Then we describe novel techniques for stabilizing PSD performance at lower neutron energies in the field. While these methods for the field do not require ToF data, we use ToF data to validate them. Finally, we carry out a neutron-spectroscopy calculation with a standard 252 Cf neutron source to demonstrate the deleterious impact that particle misclassification can have on spectral estimates, and how it can be overcome.
A. Motivation: neutron spectroscopy for arms-control
Neutron spectroscopy represents an untapped resource for arms-control verification. While the possible applications are numerous-ranging from plutonium accounting 2 ([5] , [10] ) to global assay of UF 6 containers (as opposed to assay of outer layer of UF 6 ) [11]-we have set our sights on a fairly demanding application: verifying the presence of certain warhead attributes relevant for dismantlement verification [12] - [14] , such as the presence and symmetry of high-explosive and neutron reflecting components [15] . These warhead components contain low-Z elements with distinctive neutron-interaction cross sections, and they would introduce identifiable features to the spectra of plutonium-born neutrons passing through them. In a recent publication, we showed that our unfolding capabilities with deuterated organic scintillators can resolve many of these features [5] . If this capability were further developed, it could be combined with other forms of scintillator data (multiplicity counting and low-resolution γ -ray spectroscopy) to identify several treaty-relevant warhead attributes without acquiring design information. 3 Due to their weakly-interacting nature, spectroscopy of fast neutrons is a difficult problem. While numerous detection techniques exist (see, for instance, refs. [16] and [17] ), each has its own difficulties, and we find that organic scintillators offer the best combination of high intrinsic detection efficiency (we typically observe between 0.1-0.6 counts/neutron depending on geometry of active volume) and preservation of energy information. 4 The PHS n of neutron-attributed pulses detected in organic scintillators is related to the spectrum φ of incident neutrons via a detector response matrix operator R
where R is highly ill-conditioned. Hence, inversion of R to solve for φ is an ill-posed inverse problem, colloquially known as spectrum unfolding. As with general matrix inversion problems with ill-conditioned matrices, small perturbations on the pulse-height spectrum n are typically amplified in the unfolding process to introduce large error components in the solutions [8] , [18] , [19] . 2 Distinction between metal and oxide forms of weapons plutonium for treaty verification is, as yet, an unresolved issue (see Ref. [10] ). It could be achieved using neutron spectroscopy techniques similar to those proposed by the authors in Ref. [5] . 3 Warhead measurements for arms-control verification cannot reveal classified design information and this precludes use of very sensitive measurements such as high-resolution γ -ray spectroscopy. 4 Two possible alternatives should be mentioned. Capture-gated detectors produce a capture pulse for neutrons that become fully thermalized within the detector active volume. But gating on these pulses does not fully constrain the relation between incident neutron energy and pulse height. The nonlinear light-output relation means that variation in collision history (for neutrons of the same incident energy that become thermalized) skews the pulse height. In addition, only a small number of incident neutrons become thermalized, yielding low neutron-detection efficiencies (see Ref. [16] ). Cutler-Shalev detectors can preserve energy information, but again with very low intrinsic detection efficiency (counts/neutrons incident) (see Ref. [17] ).
In previous publications we identified several improvements for spectrum unfolding, including the use of deuterated solvents like EJ315 (rather than standard hydrogen-based liquids like NE213) [24] ; careful measurement of response matrix R using accelerator-based ToF procedures (rather than Monte Carlo simulations) [20] ; and a judicious discretization mesh (in pulse-height space) that removes detector nonlinearity introduced by light-output quenching [5] . For the purposes of this article, all of these advances will be taken as given. But the issue of n-γ discrimination in the context of spectrum unfolding deserves its own article. As we will see, variation in n-γ discrimination efficiency or in γ /n ratio of incident fields can introduce distortions to the low-pulse-height region of the PHS. These distortions may appear minor in pulse-height space, but they become greatly amplified in the spectrum unfolding process. Additionally, since much of the spectral structure of interest is in the low-energy range (many distinctive features in the cross sections of isotopes contained in highexplosive and neutron-reflecting warhead components appear below one MeV [5] ), extending sensitivity to these regions would greatly benefit the warhead verification measurements we propose.
B. Particle identification with Pulse-shape discrimination
Pulse-shape discrimination relies on a difference in the tail prominence between neutron-and γ -ray-associated scintillation pulses (for general literature on PSD, see refs. [21] - [30] ). A common method compares a charge integral over the tail of a pulse to a second integral over the entire pulse duration. Figure 1 shows a charge-integration plot (tail versus total integral) for 10 6 detected pulses arising from a mixed radiation field (neutrons and γ -rays produced via the reaction 11 B(d,n), E d = 5.5 MeV). As can be seen from the plot, neutron and γ -ray events are separated into two distinct plumes and a common way to implement n-γ discrimination is to visually place a discrimination-gate curve between the two distributions. However, the neutron and γ -ray distributions merge at the low end of the pulse-height axis, so that discrimination between small pulses is problematic. In practice, a pulseheight threshold is often implemented to remove these small pulses. But for arms-control applications we want to lower the pulse-height threshold in order to increase sensitivity to lowerenergy neutrons. If the merging components of each plume are retained, then particle misclassification will influence the shape of the neutron-attributed PHS at the low-pulse-height end.
It is useful here to distinguish between two ways that misclassification affects the PHS. The first is variation of location of the particle discrimination curve with respect to the two plumes. Figure 1 includes two different discrimination curves that are displaced by a very small amount. Later sections of this paper will refer back to these as PSD gate 1 (upper curve) and PSD gate 2. We will see in Sec. II.B that this small difference influences the low-end shape of pulseheight response considerably. For spectrum unfolding, we hope that the response of the detector in the field resembles as closely as possible that represented in the response matrix model R used for unfolding. In particular, the misclassification rates-defined as the fraction of detected particles of a given type that are misclassified-are enfolded into the shape of the response matrix. Hence, they should be the same in the field as when the response matrix was measured, or else the response matrix will be an inaccurate representation of detector response in the field (leading to poor unfolding results). In Sec. III.B we will propose a procedure that can be used in the field to match the PSD misclassification rates of a deployed detector to those associated with a previouslymeasured response matrix R.
The second way in which PHS can be influenced is by variation in γ /n ratio of incident fields. Measurements with plutonium will face large γ /n ratios, and even if PSD is optimized and consistent with R, some γ -rays will leak into the PHS and distort unfolded solutions. In Sec. III.C we will discuss a method for correcting these distortions on PHS.
II. TRACKING VARIATION OF PSD PERFORMANCE IN LABORATORY SETTING
In order to characterize changes in PSD performance and relate them to observable changes in detector response, we need a way of discriminating neutrons from γ -rays that is independent of PSD. This can be achieved in the laboratory using the same accelerator-based time-of-flight (ToF) techniques as used for measuring response matrices (see ref. [20] ). While this alternate means of distinction is not perfect-some γ -rays and neutrons are scattered back into the detector and are hence time-uncorrelated-the uncorrelated fluence can be corrected for quite effectively in aggregate. And since response-matrix data is accumulated at the same time, we can observe how changes in PSD performance influence response-matrix shape.
It is important to be clear about the role we intend for ToF measurements, especially since most deployment scenarios in the field preclude a ToF setup (otherwise, spectrum unfolding would not be needed). First, we have argued elsewhere that spectrum-unfolding results are improved when the response matrix of the detector used is carefully measured using ToF techniques [20] . Part of the matrix-calculation procedure should include calculation (from the same ToF data) of misclassification rates that prevailed during the matrix measurement, since those are enfolded into the measured matrix. These should be provided along with the matrix itself, so that practitioners in the field can conform PSD performance of the detector in the field to that enfolded into the matrix (see Sec. III.B). Second, we use ToF data here to validate the techniques proposed in Sec. III for estimating and correcting for misclassification rates.
A. Time-of-Flight Measurements at University of Notre Dame
The Nuclear Structure Laboratory at University of Notre Dame (UND-NSL) houses a 10-MV tandem Van de Graaff accelerator facility which can be used to produce pulsed neutron sources of continuous energy spectra. While UND-NSL is traditionally a basic-science facility, we have recently modified it in order to facilitate detailed detector characterizations using the reaction 11 B(d,n) in a thick target with deuteron energy 5 MeV < E d < 16 MeV, and with a ToF path length of up to twelve meters. We have previously used this setup to measure response matrices for several detectors, including our three-bytwo-inch EJ315 scintillator [20] , [31] , [32] . The data for the calculations reported here were taken with the EJ315 detector placed at 10.84 m from the target with E d = 5.5 MeV. Data were taken for nine hours in total. Figure 2 shows ToF curves for PSD-tagged γ -rays and neutrons using PSD gate 2 (shown in Fig. 1 ). Detected events associated with γ -rays are contained within sharp peaks at around 33 ns along the ToF axis, while neutron events are spread out over a broad distribution corresponding to the continuous spectrum from 11 B(d,n) in the thick target 5 . Timeof-flight-correlated distributions are superimposed over a flat background of uncorrelated γ -ray and neutron events. This background can be corrected for by sampling a ∼50ns region just prior to the γ -ray peak to calculate the mean background rate and subtracting that from the ToF regions of interest (note that the γ -ray-reflection tail diminishes before the neutron distribution begins).
Due to the low pulse-height threshold used, a substantial number of γ -rays are misclassified by the PSD analysis, as is apparent by the presence of a 'γ -ray misclassification peak' in the ToF curve for PSD-tagged neutrons. Likewise, some neutrons are misclassified, as is apparent by the spectral features in the 'neutron-misclassification distribution' contained in the ToF curve for PSD-tagged γ -rays. We can estimate aggregate γ -ray and neutron misclassification rates by comparing integrals over different regions of these plots. First, average background rate (BG) is calculated as described above. Then, integration limits are set for the γ -ray-peak and neutrondistribution regions (γ reg and n reg). The misclassification rates ε γ and ε n are calculated (2) and (3), as shown at the bottom of this page, respectively. The ToF data can also be used to estimate neutron and γ -ray misclassification rates as functions of pulse-height. First, the neutron and γ -ray datas in Fig. 2 are further binned by pulse-height, creating a separate ToF plot for each pulse-height group. Then we apply the above integrations and calculations for each pulse-height group separately.
B. Variation in PSD Gate and γ /n Ratio
In order to understand the effect that a small shift in the PSD gate has on the misclassification rates, and ultimately on the response matrix, consider the two similarly-placed PSD gates, shown in Fig. 1 , separated by an offset that is nearly imperceptible by visual inspection. If PSD gates are visually placed in the field it is reasonable to expect at least this much variation in their location (with respect to features in the PSD plot), if not considerably more. Additionally, temperature or gain shifts would cause the features of the PSD plot to shift with respect to a stationary gate curve and this would have a similar effect on PSD performance. Figure 3 shows the pulse-heightdependent ToF-estimated misclassification-rate curves, calculated as described in Sec. II.A. The result using PSD gate 1 is shown on the left and that from PSD gate 2 is on the right. These curves show a dramatic change in misclassification rates for low pulse-height groups, just from the subtle displacement between PSD gates 1 and 2. Standard methods of uncertaintypropagation give fractional uncertainties ranging over 0.01 < σ ε /ε < 0.04 (too small for the plot). Fig. 3 . Neutron-and γ -ray-misclassification-rate curves, measured using ToF, for two different PSD discrimination lines (PSD gates 1 and 2 in Fig. 1 ).
Next, we can see how shifts in PSD gates and in γ /n ratio influence the shape of pulse-height response. Figure 4 shows selected columns of three different response matrices calculated from the same ToF dataset as was represented in Figs. 1-3 . Each matrix column corresponds to the pulseheight response to neutron-attributed pulses within a ToF gate corresponding to a 100-keV-wide energy window (energy groups with lower bounds ranging from 1.5 to 4 MeV are shown). The matrices represented in the top and middle plots were calculated using PSD gates 1 and 2 respectively. Within the ToF gates, uncorrelated background contributes around one γ -ray for every twenty neutrons incident on the detector. By zooming into the low-pulse-height region, we can see the difference in misclassification-rates manifest in the response shape: the neutron-pulse-height response ramps down at the low pulse-height end when PSD gate 1 is used, and it ramps up when PSD gate 2 is used. Note here that even with very low γ /n ratio enforced by ToF gating, there is still a change in response matrix shape due mostly to the change in neutron misclassification rate. Hence, even if no γ -rays are incident on the detector in a field measurement, PSD gates 1 and 2 will result in different pulse-height response shapes.
In order to see the effect of variation in γ /n ratio, we conducted a third calculation of pulse-height response (lower part of Fig. 4 ). This matrix was calculated using PSD gate 1, but with added γ -ray events superimposed from the γ -ray peak to simulate a higher ratio of γ /n∼ 10. The effect on the low end of pulse-height response is quite pronounced and would significantly distort unfolded spectra if not accounted for. This Selected columns of the response matrices calculated from the same ToF data. The matrices represented in the top and middle plots were calculated using PSD gates 1 and 2 (see Fig. 1 ) and incident fields within the ToF gates have γ /n ∼ 0.05. The matrix represented in the bottom plot was calculated using PSD gate 1, but extra γ -ray data was added, yielding γ /n ∼10. Variation in pulse-height response is seen in the low-pulse-height region.
contributes greatly to the difficulty of spectrum unfolding from measured PHS in practice.
III. PSD GATING IN THE FIELD FOR SPECTRUM UNFOLDING
The preceding sections have demonstrated that variations in location of user-defined PSD gate and γ /n ratio change the shape of pulse-height response. These effects are easy to identify with ToF (as shown in Sec. II), but deployment scenarios typically preclude ToF measurements. In the following sections, we describe steps that can be taken in the field to identify and remove the distortions on PHS that result from n-γ misclassification. These techniques rely only on information that either can be included with the response matrix or is available from the field measurements themselves.
A. Estimating Misclassification Rates in the Field
This section outlines a procedure for estimating misclassification rates in the field using the statistical shapes of PSD distributions within each pulse-height bin. We validate this procedure using the ToF data presented in Sec. II.
First, all pulse-height data (γ -rays and neutrons) are grouped (let i index groups) according to the discretization scheme in pulse-height space that will be used in the unfolding process (identical to that used in the response matrix). Within each bin, data are distributed according to the ratio between pulse-tail integral and pulse-total integral. As a demonstration, Fig. 5 shows the tail/total distributions for three selected pulseheight groups: i = 7 (corresponding to pulse-height region 0.047 < L < 0.059 MeVee), i = 10 (0.086 < L < 0.1 MeVee) and i = 13 (0.13 < L < 0.15 MeVee). Fitting a double Gaussian curve to the tail-integral distributions yields excellent fits, as expected from the statistical nature of blurring and overlapping of the neutron and γ -ray PSD plumes (governed largely by the counting statistics of scintillation photons, see Ref. [26] ). Normalized χ 2 values for the fits, listed in the legend, are near unity, indicating good agreement between fit and data. For pulse-height groups i > / = 5, (pulse height L > 25 keVee) the χ 2 are generally distributed close to unity as expected.
We can expect the shapes of these curves to be somewhat stable across measurement scenarios, so long as pulse-height calibration is monitored and accurate (which is generally crucial for spectrum unfolding). Variation in γ /n ratio and energy spectra of detected radiation fields would change the relative heights of the neutron and γ -ray peaks within each pulse-height group, but not their widths or centroid positions. For a given PSD gate within each group, each Gaussian fit will have a portion that extends across the gate and these can serve as an estimate of the misclassification rates. For instance, the fractional area of the Gaussian fit associated with γ -rays that Fig. 6 . Estimation of misclassification rates within a pulse-height group using normalized double Gaussian fit. When a PSD gate is applied, portions of the neutron and γ -ray fits that extend across the gate correspond to the respective misclassification rates. Fig. 7 . Misclassification-rate curves for γ -rays and neutrons calculated using Gaussian fits to tail/total distributions (available in field). Comparison is made with ToF-calculated misclassification rates for validation. extends across the gate to the neutron side corresponds to the fraction of γ -rays that are misclassified by the gate; visa-versa for neutrons. This is illustrated in Fig. 6 .
In order to validate this process, we can compare misclassification rates calculated according to the Gaussian fits to PSD data (obtainable in the field) to those calculated using ToF data (obtainable only in laboratory setting). Figure 7 shows this comparison using the data measured in our nine-hour ToF measurement. Rather than applying a PSD-gate curve as in previous sections, we applied a gate directly to each pulseheight group separately, based on the tail/total distributions. Misclassification rates were calculated within each group by integrating the section of each Gaussian (normalized to probability units) extending beyond the PSD-gate limit. These are plotted along with misclassification rates calculated using ToF data, We find excellent agreement between both methods, adding confidence to the validity of the fit-derived method.
Uncertainty estimates, represented in the figure, for the fit-derived misclassification rates are calculated based on the confidence regions of the fit parameters. We estimate fractional uncertainty of 0.01 < σ ε /ε < 0.05 for pulse-height groups above L > 25 keVee (below this, fractional uncertainty increases up to around σ ε /ε ∼ 0.2.). Uncertainty estimates for the ToF-derived misclassification rates are low-0.01 < σ ε /ε < 0.04-as in the case presented in Sec. II.B. They are left out of Fig. 7 .
This procedure for estimating misclassification rates in the field represents a starting point and could be improved upon if needed. The six-parameter double-Gaussian fit could be reduced to four parameter fit by fixing the width and centroid of the γ -ray peak to those observed with a 137 Cs γ -ray calibration source. Alternatively, if a 252 Cf neutron source is available, then parameters for both Gaussians could be constrained in a calibration procedure. Both of these steps could improve accuracy of fits for incident fields of very high γ /n ratio.
B. Conforming PSD Performance to the Response Matrix
Accurate spectrum unfolding requires that detector pulseheight response during field measurements matches, as closely as possible, that represented by the response matrix R used for unfolding. This includes misclassification rates. Hence, within each pulse-height group, the PSD gate should be set so as to enforce the same neutron misclassification rate represented in the matrix. This can be achieved using the fitting procedure outlined in the previous section, along with the definition of the normal distribution. For instance, imagine we want to enforce a neutron-misclassification rate of ε n = 5% within a particular pulse-height group. For data obeying a normal distribution, 10% of data points fall outside 1.6 standard deviations away from the Gaussian centroid (5% on either side). Hence, using the centroid u n and width parameter σ n for the neutron peak calculated from the double Gaussian fit, placing the PSD limit 1.6σ n to the left of the neutron centroid u n would enforce a neutron misclassification rate of 5%. In general, to enforce a given neutron misclassification rate ε n within a pulse-height bin, the PSD limit that gate should be set according to
where t ε is the t-statistic associated with the sought misclassification rate ε n . This can be done in the field so as to match a neutron misclassification rate curve associated with a measured response matrix.
C. Correction of γ -Ray Misclassification
The fitting procedure presented in Sec. III.A positions us to correct PHS for variation in γ /n ratio. For each pulse-height bin, we have access to the numbers of PSD-tagged neutron and γ -ray pulses (n ( P S Dn) and n ( P S Dγ ) respectively), along with estimates of the misclassification rates. Thus, we can represent the 'true' numbers of detected neutrons (n (detn) ) and γ -rays (n (detγ ) ) as unknowns in a system of equations
and solve for estimates of the true detected counts of each type. We can demonstrate this procedure on ToF-gated neutron pulse-height spectra of different energies (equivalent to un-normalized columns of the response matrix). Figure 8 shows two examples. In each, the dotted curve represents PSD-tagged neutron PHS with γ /n ∼ 0.05 (uncorrelated γ -ray background contributes around one γ -ray for each incident ToF-gated neutron; see Sec. II). The gray curve represents the same neutron PHS with much larger γ /n ratio, obtained by adding data from the γ -ray-peak ToF region. Both of these curves entail the same misclassification-rate curves, but the higher prevalence of incident γ -rays leads to much higher absolute numbers of γ -ray misclassification. This is apparent from the fact that the gray curve ramps up dramatically in the low-pulse-height region. In order to correct for this distortion in PHS shape, we use the misclassification rates obtained from the fitting procedure described in the previous section and solve Eqs. (9) and (10) for n (det n) . The results are plotted as the diamond markers. As can be seen, the corrected pulseheight spectra with γ /n = 123.6 and γ /n = 207.4 are restored considerably and resemble very closely the pulseheight spectra associated with low γ /n = 0.05.
D. Application to an unfolding problem
This section demonstrates the significance of the proposed n-γ discrimination techniques to neutron spectrum unfolding. As described in Sec. I.A above, we have shown that unfolding from deuterated scintillators could resolve fine features (on the order of 100-keV in width) introduced to a neutron spectrum by attenuating low-Z elements comprising the high-explosive and neutron-reflecting components of a nuclear weapon (see Ref. [5] ). However, the distortions introduced to unfolded spectra by errors in measured PHS-including those from misclassified γ -rays or shifts in PSD performance-look similar to the fine spectral features of interest. Hence, they must be controlled if the features of interest are to be identified.
In this demonstration, we unfold the Watt spectrum emitted from 252 Cf, measured with the same EJ315 detector. The 252 Cf Watt spectrum is chosen for this demonstration since it is similar to that emitted by plutonium (the same Watt-spectrum shape but with different coefficients) and its smoothness will make errors in the unfolded solutions easy to pick out for the demonstration. Three PHS are unfolded, each shown in Fig. 9 . First, the dashed line represents the raw measured spectrum, using a PSD gate that enforces γ -ray misclassification curve consistent with the measured matrix used for unfolding. Yet, since there is a substantial γ -ray field associated with 252 Cf-around 5.5 γ -rays emitted for each neutron-and since a fraction of those are misclassified, then the low end of the PHS is shifted upwards relative to what it would be in the absence of γ -rays (note that the matrix was measured with data from which most γ -rays were removed using ToF). The second, solid-gray, curve in Fig. 9 represents the same measured neutron PHS, but with γ -ray data added from 137 Cs to simulate a ratio γ /n ∼ 55. This is closer to what would be faced when measuring plutonium. The third curve (diamond markers) in Fig. 9 represents the PHS corrected with the technique demonstrated in Sec. III.C. Note that the misclassified γ -rays in the real measurement (dashed line) displace the PHS curve only slightly from the corrected curve (diamond markers). 6 The lower pulseheight threshold for detection is extremely low, corresponding to 27 keVee. Approximately 3×10 6 neutrons were incident on Each spectrum is unfolded using a simple conjugategradient method [32] , along with standard Tikhonov regularization (L-curve method is used to optimize regularization constant) [18] , [19] . Figure 10 shows the unfolded results. The result from the un-altered PHS (γ /n ∼ 5.5) is shown in the top plot of Fig. 10 . Substantial oscillatory error is introduced at the low end resulting from the misclassified γ -rays, even though the effect they have on the PHS shape is small. While they are somewhat contained to the lowenergy range (0.4 < E n < 1.5 MeV), this range contains many of the features of interest that would identify the low -Z elements of interest for verifying presence of high-explosive and neutron-reflecting warhead components (Ref. [5] ). These distortions, if left un-corrected, would make such arms-control measurements impossible. Also, we note that these distortions are similar to what we find from variation in PSD gate, such as that discussed in Sec. I.B.
The middle plot in Fig. 10 shows the unfolded result from the PHS with artificially added γ -rays (γ /n ∼ 55). The distortions resulting from misclassified γ -rays are profound, and they extend across the entire spectrum. These would likely render unfolded spectra useless for most applications. This result also highlights one of the confounding difficulties of spectrum unfolding: that errors in one region (in pulse-height space) of the PHS can distort the unfolded solutions across a much wider range (in energy space) (see Refs. [18] , [19] ). The lower plot in Fig. 10 shows the unfolded result from the corrected PHS. Bin widths are E n = 100keV and the solution includes energies down to around E n = 0.4 MeV. Distortions in this solution are minimal. This shows the importance of stabilizing PSD shape in the face of variation in misclassified γ -ray components that are expected in real measurements.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed methods for PSD gating that can preserve the shape of PHS for neutron spectrum unfolding procedures. A method for estimating γ -ray and neutron misclassification rates in the field is presented. It makes use of the repeatable PSD distributions that arise from stochastic processes and we validate it using accelerator-based ToF measurements. Then, we propose methods for matching misclassification rates in the field to those represented in a response matrix used for unfolding, and for removing distortions on PHS that arise from variation of γ /n ratio of incident fields. Finally, we demonstrate the importance of the proposed techniques for spectrum unfolding with an unfolding demonstration, in which we unfold the 252 Cf Watt spectrum with different γ /n ratios. We find that correcting for misclassified γ -ray components results in better unfolded solutions. Future investigations could include a systematic study of detector function under temperature change and aging, and application of the methods proposed here to other detector types. These methods could pave the way for application of neutron spectrum unfolding to a variety of arms control challenges, including warhead attribute characterization for the verification of arms reduction treaties.
